This paper provides a general framework for estimating the welfare impact of government policy changes towards taxes, transfers, and publicly provided goods. The results show that the behavioral response required for welfare measurement is the causal impact of each agent's response to the policy on the government's budget. A decomposition of this response into income and substitution effects is not required. Because the desired elasticities vary with the policy in question, I term them policy elasticities. I also provide an additivity condition that yields a natural definition of the marginal costs of public funds as the welfare cost of policies that raise government revenue. Finally, I use the model, along with causal estimates from previous literature, to study the welfare impact of a policy that increases the generosity of the earned income tax credit financed by an increase in the top marginal income tax rate. I show existing causal estimates suggest additional redistribution is desirable if and only if providing an additional $0.44 to an EITC-eligible single mother (earning less than $40,000) is preferred to providing an additional $1 to a person subject to the top marginal tax rate (earning more than $400,000).
Introduction
Behavioral responses to price changes are often needed to measure the welfare impact of government policy. Most commonly, a Hicksian (compensated) elasticity is argued to play a central role:
While decisions on the appropriate size of government must be left to the political process, economists can assist that decision by indicating the magnitude of the total marginal cost of increased government spending. That cost depends on the structure of taxes, the distribution of income, and the compensated elasticity of the tax base with respect to a marginal change in tax rates. (Feldstein (2012)) Graduate textbooks teach that the two central aspects of the public sector, optimal progressivity of the tax-and-transfer system, as well as the optimal size of the public sector, depend (inversely) on the compensated elasticity of labor supply with respect to the marginal tax rate. A common approach is to exploit natural experiments, such as policies that change marginal tax rates (Goolsbee (1999); Feldstein (1999) ). However, a limitation of this approach is explained by Goolsbee (1999, p8) : "The theory largely relates to compensated elasticities, whereas the natural experiments provide information primarily on the uncompensated effects". Rarely do policy changes hold people's utility constant. Thus, it would appear that the type of behavioral changes induced by most policy changes does not deliver an estimate of the elasticities required for making welfare statements about the policy. This paper re-examines the types of behavioral responses that are required for welfare estimation in a general framework with taxes, transfers, and publicly provided goods. I show that three terms comprise the welfare impact of a policy on a given individual. Two of these terms are straightforward and are effectively defined by the policy: the change of net government transfers to the individual and, to the extent to which these transfers are made through publicly provided goods, the differential value of publicly provided goods relative to transfers (the standard condition from Samuelson (1954) ). The remaining term captures the importance of behavioral responses: the causal effect of the behavioral response to the policy change on the government's budget.
The causal impact of the policy on behavior affecting the government budget matters because of a fiscal externality. By the envelope theorem, an agents' behavioral response to a policy does not directly affect her utility to the extent to which she pays the cost of her behavior. Hence, the welfare importance of the behavioral response is the impact on the costs she does not pay: the fiscal externality imposed on the government. Because only this externality matters, a decomposition of the behavioral response into income or substitution effects is not necessary. If the policy takes income through distortions in prices without any compensation, the Marshallian elasticity is required. If the policy takes income through distortions in prices but also increases provision of public goods, one requires the behavioral response to the simultaneous distortion in prices and increase in public goods.
Because the desired elasticities vary with the policy in question, I term them the policy elasticities.
Hicksian (compensated) elasticities are causal effects of policies that hold utility constant. Hence, they are not in general sufficient for marginal welfare analysis. However, my framework nests the two common settings found in previous literature for which Hicksian elasticities arise. First, the optimal commodity taxation problem posed by Ramsey (1927) and analyzed in detail by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) , studies the welfare impact of policies that raise commodity taxes on one good and use the revenue to lower commodity taxes on another good. The welfare impact of such a policy depends on the causal impact of the response to the policy on the government's budget. At the optimum, marginal budget-neutral changes to commodity taxes has no impact on utility; hence, the compensated revenue loss of lowering prices on one good must equal the compensated revenue increase of raising taxes on the other good -precisely the result of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) . But, away from the optimum, the welfare impact of policies that change commodity taxes does not depend on Hicksian responses; rather, it depends on the causal effects of the policy change -i.e. the policy elasticities.
Second, the Hicksian elasticity is a key input to the compensating variation (CV) measure of marginal deadweight loss (MDWL) (Mas-Colell et al. (1995) ; Dahlby (2008) ). The CV MDWL measures amount of additional revenue the government could obtain by replacing taxation that distorts prices (e.g. the marginal income tax) with an individual-specific lump-sum tax, holding utility constant. Hicksian elasticities provide the correct measure because utility is held constant in the hypothetical policy experiment. However, this hypothetical policy experiment is left incomplete: it does not specify how the raised revenue is spent by the government. 1 Such spending would affect utilities.
Thus, the causal effect (and welfare impact) of policies actually aimed at reducing the distortionary burden of taxation would not be governed by a Hicksian elasticity, but rather by the causal effects of the actual policy -i.e. the policy elasticities.
My results show it is sufficient to consider the impact of tax and expenditure aspects of government policy jointly. 2 However, I also provide conditions under which one can sum tax and expenditure welfare analyses to form a welfare estimate of a comprehensive budget-neutral policy. The key requirement is that the components of the two policies add together to form the comprehensive policy. For example, if a tax policy raises marginal tax rates and puts the money in the government budget, then the corresponding expenditure policy must spend from the government budget; hence the budget impacts cancel when forming the budget-neutral policy. If the tax policy raises marginal tax rates but returns the revenue lump-sum, then the expenditure policy must be one that imposes a lump-sum tax for its financing; hence the sum of the two policies yields an expenditure policy financed through an increase in marginal tax rates. Because most expenditure policies spend resources from general government revenue, my results naturally advocate a particular definition of the marginal costs of public funds (MCPF): the welfare impact on those taxed by policies that raise $1 in government revenue. With the MCPF defined as such, they can be combined with a welfare analysis of an expenditure policy that spends general revenue to form a comprehensive welfare analysis.
Finally, I provide an empirical application of my welfare framework. I ask whether the government should raise the top marginal income tax rate to finance an increase in the size of the earned income tax credit (EITC) to low-income single mothers. 3 I show that whether redistribution is desirable depends on two numbers (1) the ratio of the social marginal utility of incomes for rich and poor and (2) how much of the mechanical revenue raised from the rich reaches the poor after subtracting the impact of all behavioral responses (e.g. by both rich and poor). This is precisely Okun's leaky bucket experiment (Okun (1975) ), where the leaks are given by the policy elasticities of the redistributive policy.
If one could estimate the effect of the behavioral response to this redistributive policy on the government's budget, then one could directly estimate the size of Okun's bucket and decide whether additional redistribution is desirable. However, most studies have considered the EITC and top tax rate experiments in isolation. Therefore, I use the additivity condition to show that Okun's bucket can be written as the ratio of marginal costs of public funds: the welfare impact on the rich of raising $1 by increasing the top marginal income tax rate, and the welfare impact on the poor of spending this $1 through an increase in EITC benefits. I show estimates of causal effects in each of these literatures 4 suggests a MCPF for the tax policy of roughly $2 and a MCPF for the EITC of roughly $0.88. Hence, additional redistribution is desirable as long as one prefers $0.44 in the hands of an EITC recipient to $1 in the hands of someone taxed at the top marginal income tax rate. 5
This paper is related to a rich literature analyzing the welfare implications of taxation, public goods and redistribution (see summaries in Auerbach and Hines (2002) and Saez et al. (2012) ). In particular, I build on the optimal taxation literature that expresses social optimality conditions in terms of estimable elasticities, beginning with Saez (2001) (see Piketty and Saez (2012) for a summary of subsequent literature). In contrast to this literature , I do not solve optimality conditions. 6 Rather, I quantify marginal welfare impact of government policy movements from the status quo. Hence, my resulting elasticities depend on causal effects defined locally around the status quo, which naturally corresponds to the types of elasticities estimated in empirical literature. In this sense, my paper also builds on the "sufficient statistics" literature which uses the envelope theorem to characterize marginal welfare impacts of policies in terms of local reduced-form elasticities (Chetty (2009b) ). My results show that, in a general class of models, the causal impact of the behavioral response to the policy on the government's budget is a sufficient statistic for all behavioral elasticities when measuring the marginal welfare impact of the policy. This paper also relates to the large literature defining and estimating many different notions of the MCPF (see Dahlby (2008) for a classification of these definitions). My proposal of using the marginal welfare impact of policies that raise government revenue is advocated by Yitzhaki (1996, 2001 ). 7 But, my additivity condition also that other MCPF definitions could be used. 8 Different 4 See Hotz and Scholz (2003) and Chetty et al. (2013) for a review of the EITC responses and Saez et al. (2012) for a review of responses to top marginal income tax changes.
5 Taking broader ranges of estimates from existing literature yields estimates ranging from $0.25-$0.76 in the hands of the EITC recipient relative to $1 for the rich.
6 For example, many previous approaches to studying redistribution rely on the Hamiltonian-based mechanism design approach initiated by Mirrlees (1971) and implemented by Saez (2001) among others. The first order conditions from the Hamiltonian approach provides insight into the optimal slope of the tax schedule, but the optimal level of the schedule is identified from the transversality condition (i.e. budget constraint) which depends on the integral of these elasticities (Piketty and Saez (2012) ). Hence, one can derive the optimal level of redistribution to the poor only in the case in which the entire tax schedule is optimized (put differently, it is possible to easily solve for the optimal slope of the EITC schedule, but not the optimal level of benefits using the Hamiltonian). In contrast, my approach does provide information about whether the level of benefits to the poor should be increased through the particular redistributive policy in question.
7 They cite Mayshar (1990) , Wildasin (1984) and Mayshar and Slemrod (1995) as inspiration. 8 These include the compensated measures proposed by the Pigou-Harberger-Browning tradition (Pigou (1947) ; Harberger (1964); Browning (1976 Browning ( , 1987 ) and the uncompensated measures of the Stiglitz-Dasgupta-Atkinson-Stern tradition (Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971) ; Atkinson and Stern (1974) ; see Dahlby (2008) or Ballard and Fullerton (1992) for a review of the compensated and uncompensated definitions of the MCPF).
MCPF definitions impose different requirements on the nature of the expenditure policy analysis to which it can be applied. By defining the MCPF as the welfare impact of policies that raise government revenue, I can combine them with a welfare analysis of policies that spend government revenue. In contrast, if one used marginal deadweight loss as a measure of the MCPF, one would need to consider an expenditure policy that was financed with lump-sum taxation. 9
Moreover, from an empirical perspective, my results also highlight the important fact that there is no single MCPF. This provides empirical support for the theoretical analysis of Kaplow (1996 Kaplow ( , 2004 Kaplow ( , 2008 ) that suggests the MCPF will be inversely related to the social marginal utility of income.
Hence, one should be clear about the hypothetical policy experiment being studied and, in particular, its redistributive component when combining expenditure policies with a MCPF adjustment.
Finally, my paper is also related to the broader discussion about the role of causal effects and identification strategies in economics (Deaton (2009); Angrist and Pischke (2010) ). I use a general model to understand the types of behavioral responses required for welfare estimation. I hope the conclusion is useful: estimates of causal effects of policies can be put into a general normative framework by multiplying by the government's tax/subsidy rate on the affected behavior.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the model and provides the main result. Section 3 discusses the relationship to previous literature focusing on the Hicksian elasticity.
Section 4 discusses the additivity condition and the marginal costs of public funds. Section 5 considers redistributive policies and places existing empirical estimates of causal effects into my normative framework. Section 6 concludes.
Model

Setup
I develop a general model to analyze the marginal welfare impact of government policy. There exist a finite set of agent types, indexed by i ∈ I, each representing equal mass in the population. Agents of type i have utility functions given by
where x i is a vector of J X goods chosen by agent i (
). Note that I allow the utility function to vary arbitrarily across types, i. I normalize units of x ij and l ij so that 1 unit of any type of labor supply produces 1 unit of any 9 Put differently, the $0.88 I estimate as the MCPF for the EITC policy is not the "compensated" MCPF as defined by the Pigou-Harberger-Browning tradition; rather the "compensated" MCPF would remove the income effects from the behavioral response to the EITC. Then, for the additivity condition to hold, one would need to re-incorporate these income effects into the corresponding tax policy.
10 For example, li1 could be labor supplied in wage work and li2 could be labor supplied in the informal (un-taxed) sector.
type of good. Thus, there are no profits and agents face a single linear budget constraint given by
where
is the vector of tax rates on private goods,
is the vector of tax rates on labor supply activities of agent i, T i is government transfers, and y i is non-labor income. 11 I assume the cost of publicly-provided goods, G ij is given by c G j for j = 1, .., J G . 12 The agent takes taxes, transfers, non-labor income, and the provision of publicly-provided goods as given and chooses goods and labor supply to maximize utility. I write an agent i's indirect utility function as
where V i depends on taxes, transfers, income, and publicly provided goods. I denote the Marshallian demand functions generated by the agent's problem by
. 13 I denote the marginal utility of wealth by λ i ,
which is the Lagrange multiplier from the type i maximization program.
Given a set of Pareto weights, {η i } for each type i, social welfare is given by
which is an implicit function of the vector of taxes, transfers, and publicly provided goods to every type in the economy. 14 11 I allow (but do not require) taxes and transfers to be individual-specific. In practice, most policies will involve taxes and transfers will not be individual-specific, potentially due to information constraints facing the government. An advantage of allowing for individual-specific taxes in my setting is that one can consider nonlinear tax settings. In particular, one can interpret Ti as "virtual income" and τ l ij as the marginal tax on labor earnings. In this case, one must be sure that the marginal tax rate used is consistent with the segment of the budget constraint that would be chosen by the agent.
12 Note this nests the case of a pure public good if c
and Gij is constant across i. 13 As is standard, I assume that the bordered Hessian of ui has nonzero determinant, so that the Marshallian demands are continuously differentiable in the vector of taxes, transfers, non-labor income, and publicly-provided goods.
14 I assume away the presence of externalities or internalities. In Appendix A.3 I show that the causal effect of the policy on behavior remains the desired behavioral response for welfare estimation even in the presence of externalities and internalities. However, one must then also measure the impact of the behavioral response to the policy on the externality/internality, in addition to the government budget.
Policy Paths
I wish to evaluate the marginal welfare impact of a government policy that affects the set of all taxes, transfers, and publicly provided goods to each agent. To do so, I define a "policy path". For any θ in a small region near 0, θ ∈ (− , ), I assign a government policy P (θ) given by
of taxes, transfers, and publicly provided goods to each type. I refer to the (multi-dimensional) function P (θ) as the policy path.
I make two assumptions about how the policy varies with θ. First, I normalize the value of the policy at θ = 0 to be the status quo:
Second, I assume that the policy path is continuously differentiable in θ (i.e. 
to be the agent's choice of goods and labor supply in policy world θ. These can be calculated by evaluating the Marshallian demands at the policy vector for each θ:
I letV i (θ) denote the utility obtained by type i under the policy P (θ).
It will be helpful to keep track of how much money the government spends on each type, i. For this, I lett i (θ) denote the net government budget directed towards type i,
is per-person government expenditure on publicly provided goods to type i, T i (θ) are net government transfers to type i, and
is the net revenue collected from type i through taxation of goods and labor.
given by i dt i dθ . My analysis does not require policies to be budget-neutral, but budget-neutrality of a policy path could be imposed by assuming
The first two terms are defined by the policy: j c G j dĜ ij dθ is how much the policy changes spending on publicly provided goods, dT i dθ is how much the policy increases direct transfers. The last term is the impact of the policy on the net revenue from goods and labor supply.
The effect of the policy on net revenue from goods and labor supply can be decomposed into two components:
The mechanical effect is the change in revenue holding behavior constant. This would be the marginal budget impact of the policy if one did not account for any behavioral responses. The behavioral impact is the impact of the behavioral response to the policy on the government's budget. , I also consider two other canonical measures of welfare. 17 First, I define the equivalent variation, EV i (θ), of policy P (θ) for type i to be amount that the consumer would be indifferent to accepting in lieu of the policy change. EV i (θ) solves
Measuring Welfare
Second, I define the compensating variation, CV i (θ), of policy P (θ) for type i to be the amount of money that must be compensated to the agent after the policy change to bring her back to her initial utility level. CV i (θ) solves
With these definitions, Proposition 1 characterizes the marginal welfare gain from pursuing the policy. Proposition 1. The three welfare measures of the marginal policy change to type i are equivalent:
and given by:
Public Spending/ Mkt Failure
where the RHS is evaluated at θ = 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.1 Proposition 1 shows that whether the policy increases welfare for type i depends on 3 numbers:
1.
dθ is the marginal willingness to pay (net of production costs) for the increase in public spending along the policy path. It is net of production cost, c G j , but does not include any additional costs incurred because the financing may come from distortionary taxation.
2.
dt i dθ is the net change in the government budget allocated to type i.
3.
is the impact of the behavioral response to the policy on the government's budget.
The first term captures the size of the market inefficiency being addressed by the publicly provided goods. 18 If the private market can efficiently supply and allocate all goods, then agents would be able to pay c g to obtain a unit of a good that is equivalent to the publicly provided good. Hence, agents' optimization would yield
To the extent to which market imperfections, such as free-riding or adverse selection, prevent efficient allocations, this term captures the net willingness to pay for the public expenditure beyond its production cost.
The second term captures the change in net transfers to agent i. Note that this term includes transfers through reduced prices on goods, change in publicly provided goods, as well as cash transfers.
For budget-neutral policies, recall that i dt i dθ = 0; in this sense, dt i dθ captures the redistributive impact of the policy. These transfers increase social welfare to the extent to which those receiving the net transfer have higher values of the social marginal utility of income than those who pay for the net transfer.
The third term is the impact of the behavioral response to the policy on the government's budget.
It is a weighted sum of the causal effects of the policy on behavior, with the weights given by the marginal tax rates. For example, if a policy fully compensates agents for their price change, it is a compensated response; if a policy does not compensate agents, it is an uncompensated response; if a policy increases tax rates to finance increased education spending, one needs to incorporate not only the impact of the increased taxes on behavior, but also incorporate the impact of the simultaneous increase in education spending on behavior that affect the government's budget. In particular, one does not need to decompose the behavioral response to the policy into income and substitution effects. 19 The results show that it is sufficient to estimate the causal impact of the behavioral response to the policy on the government's budget. Hence, in principle, one need not know how the demand for each good varies with the policy. 20 In practice, it may be easier to estimate the impact on behavior, x i and l i , and multiply by the government's revenue stake in those behaviors to arrive at the impact of the behavioral response to the policy on the government's budget. Here, the relevant behavioral responses vary with the policy in question. Hence, I define the policy response of x ij (or l ij ) as the behavioral response of x ij (or l ij ) to the policy. Similarly, I define the policy elasticity of x ij (or l ij ) as the response of log (x ij ) (or log (l ij )) to the policy. Definition 1. The policy response of x ij (or l ij ) with respect to policy P (θ) is given by
For completeness, it is also important to note that a decomposition into income and substitution effects does not in general help measure the size of market inefficiency,
− cg (income effects do not generally measure the size of market failures). Most goods have income effects, regardless of whether there is any market failure in their provision. Income and price effects depend on the Hessian (2nd derivative) of the utility function, whereas the size of the market failure,
− cg, depends on the first derivatives of the utility function (Mas-Colell et al. (1995) ). One important case in which income effects can measure the size of the market inefficiency is provided in Chetty (2008) . In his model, the first order condition for job search with separable effort can be differentiated and re-arranged such that the size of the market inefficiency can be written as a ratio of search elasticities with respect to assets and unemployment benefits. However, this identity is, to the best of my knowledge, not a general property of utility functions.
20 For example, one could use a research design to estimate the causal impact of a policy on tax receipt by the government, as in Chetty et al. (2013) for the EITC and discussed further in Section 5.
Given these definitions, the behavioral impact is given by:
where the weightsr x ij =τ x ijx ij (orr x ij =τ l ijl x ij ) equal the government revenue on each good (or labor supply). Hence, either one can directly estimate the single number in equation (8) using an empirical strategy that captures the total impact of the behavioral response on the government's budget; or one can estimate the micro-level behavioral changes x i and l i resulting from the policy and multiply by the government's stake in the behavior. In the latter case, one can either use policy responses and marginal tax rates, or using policy elasticities and government revenues on each activity.
Example. Assume there is one publicly-provided good, G, which I call roads. There is one untaxed consumption good, x, and there is one labor supply variable, l, which has a labor tax of τ l . Assume there is only one type of agent and drop i subscripts. Also, assume there is no lump-sum taxation,
Normalize θ to parameterize the amount of money spent on roads, so thatĜ (θ) = G + θ and thus dĜ dθ = 1. To impose budget neutrality, assume the marginal tax revenue is spent on roads,
In this environment, Proposition 1 implies that the marginal welfare impact is positive if and only if
where the LHS is the net willingness-to-pay for additional roads 21 ,τ l is the marginal tax rate on labor supply, and dl dθ is the policy response of labor supply; it is the response of labor supply to government expenditure on roads financed via an increase in the marginal tax rate on labor. It is the response that would be observed if the policy were undertaken to increase G financed by an increase in τ l .
The desirability of additional roads depends on how they affect government revenue. If roads increase labor supply because they make it easier to get to work, then the policy response is smaller; if roads increase the value of leisure and decrease taxable income, this makes roads less socially desirable (not because the planner doesn't value leisure, but because the fiscal externality is larger). 22
21 Note that optimization implies λ = ∂u ∂x . 22 Under the additional assumption that τ l = G, one can expand equation (9) 
In particular, if the government has only one marginal tax on all forms of taxable income and no taxes on goods, then the change in taxable income for each type i is sufficient. Moreover, one can aggregate responses across types with equal social marginal utilities of income:
then the aggregate responses for types i 1 and i 2 (e.g.
for each j) are sufficient for each individual's response to the policy.
Finally, one can aggregate behavioral responses among those for whom the policy directed towards them does not change,
In this case, the change in net government transfers, dt i dθ , precisely offsets the behavioral impact on government revenue -hence, the marginal welfare impact on type i is zero. The behavioral response of these "unaffected" types will continue to matter for calculating the overall budget impact of the program and imposing budget neutrality, but one need not separate the response amongst different unaffected types. I illustrate this further in Section 5.
Relation to Feldstein (1999) If one assumes that there is only one tax rate on aggregate taxable income and that social marginal utilities of income are the same for all types, then the aggregate taxable income elasticity is sufficient for capturing the behavioral responses required for welfare analysis. This insight was recently popularized in Feldstein (1999) . I provide two clarifications to this result. 23 First, it is in general neither the Hicksian (compensated) nor the Marshallian (uncompensated) elasticity of taxable income that is desired for analyzing the welfare impact of government policy. Rather, it is the taxable income elasticity associated with the policy in question, which depends on how the revenue is spent. Second, the taxable income elasticity is not sufficient to the extent to which individuals face multiple tax rates. For example, if capital income is taxed at a different rate than labor income, the elasticity of the sum of these two incomes would not be sufficient. Moreover, one also needs to the classic formula from Atkinson and Stern (1974) ,
where m l * ,τ is the standard marshallian elasticity of labor supply with respect to the labor tax rate, holding G fixed; and m l * ,G is the elasticity of l * with respect to G, holding τ l fixed. The policy elasticity can be computed from these two marshallian elasticities. But, such a decomposition is not necessary; the causal impact of the behavioral response on the government's budget, −τ l dl dθ
, is sufficient. 23 These clarifications are in addition to the insight of Chetty (2009a) who shows that the aggregate taxable income elasticity is not sufficient if the private marginal cost of tax avoidance is not equal to its social marginal cost.
know the extent to which policies affect consumption of subsidized goods or services (e.g. enrollment in government programs such as SSDI or unemployment insurance). In contrast, the impact of the behavioral response to the policy on the government's budget remains sufficient even in the cases when individuals face multiple tax rates on different behaviors.
Relation to the Hicksian (Compensated) Elasticity
Before turning to applications of my framework in Sections 4 and 5, it is perhaps helpful to relate my analysis to previous literature. As discussed in the introduction, previous literature has highlighted the role of Hicksian (compensated) elasticities in the welfare evaluation of government policy. However, Hicksian elasticities measure the causal effects of policy changes that hold utility constant; hence a simple corollary to Proposition 1 is that they are not sufficient for evaluating the welfare impact of policies that actually change utilities. Of course, my results do not contradict any mathematical results from previous literature on the role of the Hicksian elasticity in certain circumstances. But, my results do suggest the role of Hicksian elasticities in welfare estimation of marginal policy changes is perhaps not as prominent as previously thought.
There are two classic cases where the Hicksian elasticity arises: (1) optimal commodity taxation and the "inverse elasticity" rule and (2) marginal deadweight loss from distortionary taxation. I discuss these two examples in turn.
3.1 Optimal Commodity Taxation and the "Inverse Elasticity" Rule Ramsey (1927) proposes the question of how commodities should be taxed in order to raise a fixed government expenditure, R > 0. Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) provide a formal modeling of this environment and show that, at the optimum, the tax-weighted Hicksian price derivatives for each good are equated. Here, I illustrate this result.
Assume there is a representative agent and drop i subscripts. A necessary conditions for tax policy to be at an optimum is given by dV P dθ = 0 for all feasible policy paths, P . With a representative agent, the optimal tax would be lump-sum of size R. However, the optimal commodity tax program proposed by Ramsey (1927) makes the assumption that the government cannot conduct lump-sum taxation. Hence, the only feasible policies are those that raise and lower tax rates in a manner that preserves the budget constraint.
Consider a policy, P (θ), that lowers the tax on good 1 and raises the tax on good 2. The optimality condition is given by
Equation (10) suggests more responsive goods should be taxed at lower rates, thereby nesting the standard "inverse elasticity" argument (higher dx k dθ should be associated with lowerτ k ). The optimal tax attempts to replicate lump-sum taxes by taxing relatively inelastic goods. Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) further note that, because dV P dθ = 0 at the optimum, one can expand the behavioral change using the Hicksian demands, x h k ,
where, in general, there would be the additional term,
dθ , but this vanishes at the optimum. Hence, that the optimality condition is given by
so that the tax-weighted Hicksian responses are equated across the tax rates -precisely the classic result in Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) 
(see equation 38). 24
However, note that one never relied on compensated elasticities to test the optimality condition in equation (10). Compensated elasticities arise only because of the assumption that policy is at the optimum. One could consider any budget-neutral policy that simultaneously adjusts two commodity taxes and test equation (10) directly. Conditional on knowing the causal effects of such a policy, one would not need to know whether income or substitution effects drive the behavioral response to commodity taxes. The policy elasticities would be sufficient.
Tax Distortions and Marginal Deadweight Loss
It is also well known that compensated elasticities measure the marginal excess burden (MEB) or deadweight loss (MDWL) of the tax system. To illustrate this, again focus on one representative agent and drop i subscripts. Assume there is just one good, J X = 1, and one type of labor supply, J L = 1. Let τ denote the marginal tax on labor supply. Let P (θ) denote a policy which increases the tax rateτ (θ) = τ + θ. Assume the policy does not change publicly provided goods. Thus, the marginal welfare impact of the tax increase is given by ∂V ∂θ
where for now I refrain from specifying the impact on net transfers, dt dθ | θ=0 . Previous literature defines two measures of MDWL: a "compensated variation" (CV) and equivalent variation (EV) measure (see Mas-Colell et al. (1995) or Dahlby (2008) for a discussion). I discuss each 24 Under the additional assumption that compensated cross-price elasticities are zero, one arrives at the classic inverse elasticity rule:
so that optimal tax rates are inversely proportional to their compensated (Hicksian) demands.
of these in turn.
CV Measure of DWL The compensating variation (CV) measure of deadweight loss is the increased revenue a government could obtain switching from the distortionary taxation to lump-sum taxation while holding the agent's utility constant. Thus, marginal CV is the value of dt dθ | θ=0 that solves the equation
Because utility is held constant in this policy experiment, dl dθ | θ=0 is precisely the compensated (Hicksian) response to the policy. Thus, the Hicksian elasticity captures the additional revenue a government could collect from agents if they switched from distortionary to lump-sum taxation but held utilities constant. 25
While the CV measure of DWL provides a measure of the welfare cost of distortionary taxation, the hypothetical policy experiment is left incomplete: it does not specify how the additional revenue is spent by the government. Since this spending would affect utilities and behavior, it would need to be incorporated into a welfare analysis of an actual policy aimed at reducing the distortionary burden of taxation. 26 Welfare analysis of such a policy would no longer require the Hicksian elasticity; rather, it would require the causal effect of that particular policy -i.e. the policy elasticity.
EV Measure of DWL The second measure of deadweight loss proposed in the literature is the equivalent variation (EV) measure of deadweight loss. This is the agent's willingness to pay for switching from distortionary taxation to individual-specific lump-sum taxation in a manner that holds the government's budget constraint constant. So, the EV measure of marginal deadweight loss is the value of − ∂V ∂θ | θ=0 λ i when the marginal revenue from the tax is returned lump-sum, so that
Here, dl dθ | θ=0 is not the Hicksian elasticity. Rather, it is the behavioral response to a policy which increases marginal taxes, τ , and returns the revenue to the agent through lump-sum transfers. Because of the distortions, the lump-sum transfers are insufficient to hold the agents' utility constant. 27 Thus, dl dθ | θ=0 is a type of compensated elasticity (the tax revenue is returned to the agent), but it is not a "fully" compensated (Hicksian) elasticity.
25 This interpretation of the CV measure of DWL and the Hicksian elasticity is well-known (e.g. Auerbach (1985) ). 26 This criticism of the CV measure of DWL is related to the point raised by Kaplow (2008) that a policy experiment should completely specify all features of the policy.
27 It is straightforward to show that In contrast to the CV measure of deadweight loss, the EV measure does correspond to a budgetneutral policy experiment. However, the corresponding policy assumes that the revenue is returned to precisely the same agent from whom it is taxed. To the extent to which distortionary taxation arises because of the in-feasibility of individual-specific lump-sum transfers (Mirrlees (1971) ), this policy is not only unlikely to be observed in practice, but is infeasible given the information constraints imposed on the government. In sum, the results suggest the Hicksian elasticity is not particularly useful for marginal welfare analysis.
Additivity and the Marginal Costs of Public Funds
Additivity
While in general it is sufficient to consider the net impact of a comprehensive policy on behavior, it is often an easier empirical task to analyze the welfare impact of a comprehensive policy in two steps, first estimating the welfare impact of the expenditure policy; then incorporating an adjustment for the welfare cost of raising the required revenue. Such an approach is the motivation for the large literature on the marginal cost of public funds.
Here, I provide a condition that allows welfare impacts of policies to be added together. I then use it to define an empirically-motivated measure of the marginal costs of public funds as the welfare costs of policies that raise government revenue.
To begin, suppose one is interested in characterizing the marginal welfare impact of a policy path, P (θ). 28 Suppose that two policy paths, P T ax (θ) and P Exp (θ), sum to the policy path of interest,
Condition (12) requires that the movement from the initial policy position, P (0) towards P (θ) can be written as the sum of two movements: first in the direction of P T ax (θ) and second in the direction of P Exp (θ) (or vice-versa). This equality must hold for all components of the policy (taxes, transfers, and public provision of goods). For example, P Exp (θ) could be a policy path that spends money from the government budget on a public good; P T ax (θ) could be a policy that raises government revenue through increasing the labor tax rate. In this case, P (θ) would be a policy that simultaneously increases the labor tax rate and spends the resources on the public good.
Proposition 2. Suppose P (θ), P T ax (θ), and P Exp (θ) satisfy equation (12). Then, the marginal welfare impact of the comprehensive policy on type i, denoted
, is given by
28 Recall that for each θ, P (θ) is a vector of public expenditures, transfers, and taxes. 
where all derivatives are evaluated at θ = 0.
Given a welfare estimate of an expenditure policy,
, Proposition (2) shows how one can add a welfare estimate of a tax policy,
, in order to analyze the welfare impact of the budgetneutral policy,
. The key requirement is that the sum of the expenditure policy movement and the tax policy movement must equal the total policy of interest.
This requirement nests several points. First, one cannot ignore the impact of the response to the expenditure policy, P Exp , on the government's budget. For example, policies that increase expenditure on education should include the increased future tax revenue raised from any increased future labor earnings. Second, the location to which the are funds raised under P T ax must be precisely the location that funds are taken from for the expenditure in P Rev . If P T ax is a policy that taxes agents and returns money lump-sum (as in Section 3), then P Exp must finance the expenditure out of lump-sum taxation.
If P T ax is a policy which raises taxes and collects the money into a government surplus, P Exp must be a policy which takes money from government surplus to finance the expenditure.
Finally, the tax policy must be specific about who and what is taxed, so that it correctly corresponds to the comprehensive policy. Thus, it is arguably misleading to refer to a single number as "the" marginal cost of public funds; the welfare cost of raising resources from different people or goods may yield different welfare estimates. I return to this in Section 5 where I show that the marginal cost of raising revenue from the poor is empirically much lower than the cost of raising revenue from the rich, consistent with the theoretical predictions from previous literature (Kaplow (1996 (Kaplow ( , 2004 (Kaplow ( , 2008 ).
MCPF and Social MCPF
Equation (12) suggests there are many different ways to split a comprehensive policy into a tax and expenditure policy. Hence, it is naturally advantageous to let one's empirical setting drive the choice of decomposition. Because often policies spend resources out of general government revenue, a naturally useful measure of the marginal cost of public funds is the welfare impact on those taxed by policies that raise the government's budget by $1.
To be specific, let P denote a policy that raises revenue on typeî by increasing taxes only towards typeî, 29 One concern with this definition is that it presupposes the government is able to distinguish typeî from all other types. However, it is straightforward to show that the only requirement needed is that different types choose different allocations. Then, one can change taxes/transfers towards typeî; although some may change their behavior, the marginal movement of other types would only impose an externality on the government's budget and not provide them with any utility improvement (by the envelope theorem). Hence, the denominator of equation (14) captures the impact of other types responding to the policy. 30 The welfare impact of the policy on typeî is given by
which is simply the mechanical revenue raised from typeî. Moreover, the aggregate marginal government revenue raised from the policy is given by the sum of the mechanical revenue and the impact of the behavioral responses across the population:
so that the marginal cost of raising a dollar of revenue on typeî through a tax on labor supply activity j can be expressed as M CP FP = 1 1 + x Social MCPF In practice, policies that increase revenue may affect more than one type of individual.
In this case, $1 in welfare loss to i may be valued differently than $1 in welfare loss to type j -one needs to account for the differential social welfare weights on each type in constructing the marginal cost of public funds. 31
To do so, I define the social marginal cost of public funds in units of typeî to be
which is the sum of the welfare costs to each type,
, normalized in units of dollars to typeî,
Relation to Previous Definitions Defining the MCPF as the welfare cost of policies that raise government revenue is proposed previously by Yitzhaki (1996, 2001 ). However, it differs from a large previous literature that has sought an more structural definition of the marginal costs of public funds. Here, there are two competing traditions (Ballard and Fullerton (1992) ; Dahlby (2008)): (1) the Pigou-Harberger-Browning tradition defines the marginal cost of public funds as the marginal deadweight loss of the tax system by comparing two tax systems that generate equal revenue. This is precisely the EV measure of deadweight loss from Section 3.2 (Pigou (1947) ; Harberger (1964) ; Browning (1976 Browning ( , 1987 ); (2) the Stiglitz-Dasgupta-Atkinson-Stern approach defines the marginal cost of public funds using Marshallian elasticities, generally assuming those who are taxed receive no compensation for their tax revenue (Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971) ; Atkinson and Stern (1974) ).
Indeed, one could make an argument that the induced behavioral response to policies that increase government revenue may be either a compensated response, an uncompensated response, or neither. If agents expect the increased revenue to be returned through future transfers or publicly provided goods and then borrow against these in capital markets (i.e. Ricardian equivalence holds), then the behavioral response would be similar to a compensated response. In contrast, the uncompensated approach may describe behavior if people expect not to be compensated. An advantage of my definition of the marginal cost of public funds is that I do not necessarily need to know the extent to which Ricardian 31 This is widely recognized in the literature on the MCPF (e.g. Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2001) ) 32 Note that if one can decompose the policy P into a sum:
where Pi does not change taxes, transfers, or public goods on any type other than i. Then,
where γi is the fraction of revenue raised from policy P that is raised by policy Pi, γi =´ĩ
equivalence holds. 33 Moreover, I do not need to break the causal effects of policies into income and substitution effects; the causal impacts are sufficient.
I now illustrate this definition using the example from Section 2.3. 34
Example. (Continued) Consider the welfare cost a policy P T ax (θ) that raises θ units of revenue through a tax on labor supply,τ (θ). 35 The marginal welfare impact of this policy is
where the "−1" arises from the net negative transfer, and dl P T ax dθ | θ=0 is the behavioral response to the tax policy that increases government revenue. The marginal cost of public funds is given by one plus the causal impact of the response to taxation on the government's budget constraint. Now, let P Exp (θ) denote a policy that spendsĜ (θ) = G + θ on additional roads. Then,
where ∂u ∂g ∂u ∂x − c g is the net willingness to pay for the roads and "1" arises from the net positive transfer.
The last term, τ
is the impact of the behavioral response to the increased expenditure on roads on the government's budget. This term would be positive if roads increased labor supply; negative if it caused people to take more vacations and consume more leisure.
Combining equations (15) and (16),
33 To see this more explicitly, note that I can allow utility to be given not only by current consumption, labor, and publicly provided goods, but also the level of the government debt, B:
It is straightforward to see that the welfare impact of the policy continues to be given by Proposition 1, and the additivity condition of Proposition 2 continues to hold. Given a tax and expenditure policy such that the corresponding comprehensive policy is budget neutral, the impact of the tax policy will precisely offset the impact of the expenditure policy on the government debt. So, as long as the level of government debt is a sufficient statistic for future policy changes, one need not know how future government policy responds to either the tax or expenditure policy.
34 In Appendix A.2, I also illustrate how the CV MDWL (and hence the Hicksian elasticity) could be used as a measure of the MCPF. Because MDWL tax policies return revenue lump-sum to the agent, they require that expenditure policies measure the impact of a spending policy financed with lump-sum taxation. Because policies are rarely financed in this manner, MDWL is not a particularly useful measure of the MCPF.
35 For simplicity, I normalize the speed of the path so that
where dl P dθ | θ=0 is the joint effect of the expenditure and taxation policy on labor supply. Hence,
is precisely equal to the total welfare impact given in equation (9).
In sum, because most expenditure policies spend resources out of general government revenue, the welfare impact of policies that raise government revenue provide a natural definition of the marginal costs of public funds.
Redistribution
In this section, I analyze empirically the welfare impact of a policy that would increase the generosity of the EITC to poor single mothers financed by an increase in the top marginal income tax rate.
Naturally, the desirability of redistributing from rich to poor depends on their relative social welfare weights. Because many may disagree about such parameters, I will not solve directly for the social welfare impact of the policy. Rather, I solve for the set of implicit social marginal utilities of income that rationalize the status quo amount of redistribution as optimal, dŴ P dθ = 0. If one's own social preferences are more (less) redistributive than these implicit weights, then one would prefer a more (less) redistributive policy. From a positive (as opposed to normative) perspective, my approach will provide insight into how much the status quo implicitly values money in the hands of the poor relative to the rich.
Setup
Let P (θ) denote the policy where θ dollars are raised from the rich (via an increase in the top marginal tax rate) that are then transferred to poor single mothers (through the an increase in the size of the EITC) 36 . Letl i (θ) denote the taxable income of individual i subject to the standard income tax rate (i.e.l i excludes dividends) and letl denote the threshold above with this income is taxed at the top rate,τ Rich (θ). It will be helpful to classify individuals, i, into two (non-exhaustive) groups: i ∈ Rich, for whoml i (0) ≥l, wherel ≈ $400K, and i ∈ P oor, who are low-income single mothers currently eligible for EITC benefits, generallyl i (0) ≤ $40K.
For simplicity, I assume that the social marginal utility of income is constant among current EITC recipients, and denote it by η P oor . Similarly, I assume the social marginal utility of income is constant among the rich earning abovel, and denote this by η Rich . LetŴ P (θ) denote the social welfare under the policy P (θ). Under these two simplifications, the desirability of redistribution is characterized in the following proposition.
36 More specifically, the precise EITC policy expansion I consider is an increase in the maximum benefit level in a manner that maintains current income eligibility thresholds and tax schedule kink points (but raises the phase-in and phase-out rates in order to reach the new maximum benefit). However, the results from Chetty et al. (2013) suggest the phase-out slope of the EITC has only a minor impact on labor supply (most of the response is from individuals below the EITC maximum benefit level choosing to increase their labor supply). This suggests the impact of the behavioral response to the policy will not vary significantly for different designs of the phase-out of the program.
Proposition 3.
dŴ P dθ | θ=0 ≥ 0 if and only if
Proof. The proof is a straightforward application of Proposition 1, and is provided in Appendix A.4.
The LHS of equation (18) measures the marginal benefit to social welfare of transferring money from rich to poor. The RHS of equation (18) is the fraction of the mechanical revenue raised by taxing the rich that is able to reach the poor after subtracting the government revenue lost due to behavioral distortions.
The intuition in equation (18) is Okun's famous leaky bucket experiment (Okun (1975) ): one's preference for redistribution can be stated as how much resources one is willing to lose in order to take from the rich and give to the poor. Equation (18) is also a generalization of the standard Baily-Chetty formula for the optimal amount of social insurance (Baily (1978) ; Chetty (2006)). At the optimum, the value of transferring money from rich to poor (given by the difference in social welfare weights) is equated to its cost (given by Okun's bucket).
Before turning to the empirical implementation, it is important to note that equation (18) differs from approaches in previous literature studying optimal taxation and redistribution. These approaches generally use Hamiltonian-based methods introduced by Mirrlees (1971 ) (e.g. Saez (2001 ). Although the first order conditions of the Hamiltonian provide insight into the optimal slope of the tax schedule, the optimal level of the schedule is identified from the transversality condition (i.e. budget constraint).
Hence, the optimal level of redistribution to the poor depends on an integral of all elasticities across the income distribution, evaluated at their optimized levels (Piketty and Saez (2012) ). Such an integral is difficult to estimate in practice. In contrast, Equation (18) provides information about whether the level of benefits to the poor should be increased through the particular redistributive policy in question.
Empirical implementation: A MCPF Approach
If one could estimate the behavioral response to a simultaneous policy that increases EITC benefits and raises the top marginal tax rate, then one could estimate the LHS of equation (18) directly. In practice, causal effects studied in the literature tend to focus on each policy independently. Therefore, I use the additivity condition to write the comprehensive policy as the sum of two policies: an increase in EITC generosity by $1, P EIT C , that is financed out of government revenue; and a raising of the top marginal income tax rate, P T ax , that is used to increase government revenue by $1.
One can think of each of these policies as inducing a marginal cost of public funds. To raise $1 in tax revenue from taxes on the rich, one imposes a welfare loss on the rich given by
Similarly, to raise $1 in tax revenue through a reduction in EITC benefits, one imposes a welfare loss on the poor given by M CP F P oor
The additivity condition implies that
where the MCPF for the tax policy is subtracted, reflecting the increase in the government's budget.
The following Corollary follows from the additivity condition and Proposition 3.
Hence, Okun's bucket can be measured as a ratio of two numbers: the marginal welfare impact on the rich of raising $1 through an increase in the top marginal tax rate, M CP F Rich P T ax , and the marginal welfare impact on poor single mothers of raising $1 through an expansion of EITC benefits. I consider these in turn.
Tax Increase on Rich
There is a large literature estimating the causal effect of changes to the top marginal income tax rate.
To construct an estimate of the impact of the behavioral response on the government's budget, I make several assumptions that are common in this empirical literature. First, I assume that the policy has no spillover effects, so that the response to the top marginal income tax rate is zero amongst those whose earnings are belowl. This is commonly assumed in existing literature (e.g. Feldstein (1999) ), as lower income groups are used as controls for macroeconomic effects argued to be unrelated to the tax policy. Of course, this assumption could be relaxed if one had an estimate of the causal effect of the policy on taxable behavior of those earning below the top income tax threshold.
Second, I assume that the rich have no income shifting across tax bases with different nonzero tax rates. This rules out the program having an impact on capital gains, for example. Again, this assumption could be relaxed with additional empirical work estimating the causal effect of raising the top income tax rate on tax revenue from capital gains. 37 With these assumptions, the MCPF of raising revenue from the rich through an increase in the top marginal tax rate is given by
where r is the fraction of mechanical revenue lost from behavioral responses to the tax increase,
Here,l i is the taxable income of the rich and
dθ is the response of taxable income to a policy that raises the top marginal tax rate and uses the finances to raise government revenue. 38 Note r < 0 to the extent to which behavioral responses lower tax revenue.
There is a large literature estimating an income-weighted taxable income elasticity using variation induced by tax policies, such as the increases in top marginal tax rates in OBRA 1993 that were aimed at reducing the government budget deficit. Saez et al. (2012) show how one can multiply this elasticity by a measure of the shape of the income distribution to arrive precisely at a measure of r, the fraction of mechanical revenue lost due to behavioral distortions in taxable income. 39
It is often suggested that r measures the marginal deadweight loss or excess burden of the tax system (e.g. Saez et al. (2012) ). However, these elasticities are generally not compensated elasticities, and hence the measure of r is arguably not a measure of marginal deadweight loss from taxing the rich. Fortunately, they are causal effects of actual government policies that change the top income tax rate (e.g. the Reagan 1985/6 tax cuts and the 1993 Clinton tax increases); therefore they are precisely the policy elasticities of interest for calculating the behavioral response to policies that increase the government budget. Saez et al. (2012) note that there is a wide range of estimates of the taxable income elasticity estimated as causal effects from tax policies, but they suggest a measure of 0.5 as relatively middle-ofthe-road, which in turn implies that 50% of the mechanical revenue is lost due to behavioral responses, r = −0.5. Put differently, this suggests the marginal cost of raising $1 in government revenue from an increase in marginal income tax rates on the rich imposes a $2 welfare loss on those subjected to the tax increase.
37 More straightforwardly, an estimate of the impact of the behavioral response to aggregate tax revenue would suffice, but to my knowledge has not been constructed.
38 To see this, note that
More specifically, see equation 6 of Section 2 of Saez et al. (2012) .
There is of course considerable disagreement about the response to changes in the top marginal tax rate. So, for my analysis I will also consider robustness to results for values of −r ranging from 20-70%, consistent with the range suggested by Giertz (2009).
EITC Expansion
There is also a large literature estimating the causal effects of EITC expansions, especially impacts on single mothers. I need to make several assumption, commonly made in the empirical literature studying the EITC, to allow existing causal estimates to provide an estimate of M CP F P oor P EIT C . First, I set the policy elasticity of the EITC expansion is zero for two groups ineligible for the expansion:
(1) middle-upper income individuals above the income eligibility threshold and (2) low-income women choosing to become single mothers to become EITC eligible. I find support for (1) For EITC eligibles, I assume that the only behavioral impact of the program that affects tax revenue is through taxable labor income. Although capital income is less of an issue for EITC recipients, this assumption also rules out fiscal externalities of the EITC expansion on other social program take-up, such as SSDI or food stamps. To the extent to which an EITC expansion crowds out take-up other government services, my analysis will underestimate the social desirability of increasing funding of the EITC. With these assumptions, one obtains an expression analogous to the tax policy:
where p is the fraction of the mechanical revenue distributed that is increased due to behavioral distortions,
There are many papers studying the causal impact of the EITC expansion on labor supply and hence taxable income of the poor. Most recently, Chetty et al. (2013) exploit the geographic variation in knowledge about the marginal incentives induced by the EITC, as proxied by the local fraction of selfemployed that bunch at the subsidy-maximizing kink rate. Using the universe of tax return data from EITC recipients, their estimates suggest that the behavioral responses induced by knowledge about the marginal incentives provided by the EITC increase refunds by approximately 5% relative to what they would be in the absence of behavioral responses. Assuming areas with no self-employed bunchers 40 A further defense of this assumption is found in the EITC papers using single women without children as a control group (e.g. Eissa and Liebman (1996) ; Chetty et al. (2013) ).
are valid counterfactuals for an absence of distortionary incentives for the EITC, this suggests the causal effect of the behavioral responses to the EITC on government expenditure is 5% -i.e. p = 0.05.
It is perhaps important to note that because the empirical strategy of Chetty et al. (2013) relies on heterogeneous information about marginal incentives, it provides a causal effect of the behavioral response to the policy on government outlays without necessarily providing a specific elasticity with respect to marginal tax rates. Although they do provide a model and an associated "phase-in" and "phase-out" elasticity under some additional assumptions, my approach suggests one need not undertake such a decomposition as long as one is satisfied that the estimate of the causal impact of the program would provide a valid estimate of the causal effect of the marginal EITC expansion on the government's budget.
However, one potential concern with using the results of Chetty et al. (2013) To relate to previous literature focusing on extensive margin responses, it will be helpful to index the poor population i such that l i > 0 implies l j > 0 for j < i. Hence, there exists a threshold,î, such that i <î denotes the set of i in the labor force and,î is the labor force participation rate. The behavioral response is now given by:
where E τ l i lî is the average tax income (or loss) generated by the marginal type entering the labor force and dî dθ is the marginal rate at which the policy induces labor force entry. The extensive margin response depends on the impact of the program on the labor force participation rate, multiplied by the size of the average subsidy to those entering the labor force.
There is a large literature analyzing the impact of the EITC expansion on labor force participation of single mothers, beginning with Eissa and Liebman (1996) . These approaches generally estimate the causal effect of EITC receipt on behavior using various expansions in the generosity of the EITC program. Hotz and Scholz (2003) summarize this literature and find consistency across methodologies in estimates of the elasticity of the labor force participation rate of single mothers,î, rate with respect to the average after-tax wage, E 1 − τ l i ll , with estimates ranging from 0.69-1.16.
I translate this elasticity into equation (20) by assuming θ parameterizes an additional unit of the 41 This interpretation is clearly acknowledged by Chetty et al. (2013) . mechanical subsidy and writing:
is the elasticity of the labor force participation rate with respect to the after tax wage rate and
is the size of the subsidy as a fraction of after tax income for the marginal labor force entrant. For the elasticity of labor force participation, I choose an estimate of 0.9, equal to the midpoint of existing estimates. For and taking elasticity estimates in the 0.69-1.12 range from existing literature yields estimates ranging from 0.11 to 0.07. Hence, if one assumed only extensive margin responses were operating, the policy elasticity would be p = 0.09, ranging between 0.07 and 0.11. Adding these together with the recent intensive margin responses in Chetty et al. (2013) , I arrive at an estimate of p = 0.09 + 0.05 = 14%. I also study robustness of this number to the lower bound that Chetty et al. (2013) captures all of the EITC response (so that p = 0.05) and the upper bound that the extensive margin elasticity is 1.12 and can be added to Chetty et al. (2013) , so that p = 0.11 + 0.05 = 16%.
The estimate of p = 14% suggests that raising $1 in general government revenue through a reduction in EITC spending would only require a reduction in benefits of 1/1.14=$0.88. Hence, the marginal cost of raising public funds from poor single mothers through a reduction in their EITC benefits is $0.88. Put differently, the causal estimates from previous literature suggest that the government could lower EITC benefits mechanically by $0.88 and actually obtain an extra $1 because of the reduction in behavioral distortions.
Combining EITC and Tax Policy Combining the estimates yields M CP F P oor Giertz (2009) and the fraction of EITC revenue lost due to responses of 5-16%) yields a range of 0.26, 0.76] . Hence, at the upper range of the elasticity estimates, the results suggest roughly 75% of the mechanical revenue gain would be lost due to included behavioral distortions, so that redistribution is desirable only if one prefers $0.26 in the pocket of an EITC recipient relative to $1 in the pocket of someone subject to the top marginal tax rate. On the other end of existing estimates, redistribution is desirable as long as one prefers providing $0.76 to an EITC beneficiary over an additional $1 to someone subject to the top marginal tax rate.
Individual vs. social marginal utility of income Whether one wishes to redistribute at these costs is ultimately a matter of social preference; indeed, Okun suggested 60% leakage (Okun (1975) ) was tolerable to himself, which implies he values $0.40 in the hands of the poor equally with $1 in the hands of the rich.
Many may regard a 56% marginal reduction in economic activity to be too high a cost to pay for redistribution. But it is also perhaps helpful to compare this to standard measures of within-person preferences towards lotteries over income. In particular, suppose individuals have CRRA utility over consumption with coefficient of relative risk aversion, σ. Then, the social marginal utilities of income can be written as
where ψ Rich and ψ P oor are the relative planner weights on marginal utilities.
Assuming the rich consume at least 5 times that of the poor, and assuming σ ≥ 1, I arrive at a lower bound:
Hence, a utilitarian planner for which ψ Rich = ψ P oor , should be willing to lose 80% of the mechanical revenue in order to redistribute from rich to poor. Thus, even if redistribution would entail a loss of 75% of the mechanical revenue, a utilitarian planner should prefer additional redistribution. Put differently, under the additional assumption of CRRA utility with σ ≥ 1, the range of existing policy elasticities suggest the implicit social welfare weights that rationalize the status quo policy are regressive: ψ Rich > ψ P oor .
Conclusion
This paper provides a general framework for evaluating the welfare impact of government policy. My results suggest the causal effect of the policy in question on behavior that affects the government budget are the key behavioral parameters required for welfare analysis. Because these responses vary with the policy in question, I term these responses the policy elasticities.
I use the framework to define the marginal costs of public funds as the welfare cost of policies that raise government revenue. Finally, I study a policy of increasing the EITC generosity financed by an increase in the top marginal income tax rate. More generally, my results suggest estimates of causal impact of policies can readily be translated into a general welfare framework by multiplying the behavioral response by the government tax/subsidy on the behavior.
. Taking the total derivative of V i with respect to θ, I have
Applying the envelope theorem from the agent's maximization problem and evaluating at θ = 0 implies
Replacing terms, I have 
Finally, note that equation 7 shows I can replace the difference between the total revenue impact,
, and the mechanical revenue effect,
dθ , with the behavioral impact of the policy on the government budget constraint, yielding
A.2 MCPF with Hicksian Elasticities
Given the prominence of the Hicksian elasticity and role of MDWL in previous theoretical and empirical literature, it is perhaps helpful to explain when it could be used as a measure of the marginal cost of public funds. Let P T ax (θ) denote a policy that increases the tax rate and returns money lump-sum in a manner such that utility is held constant. Clearly, dV P T ax dθ = 0 by construction. However, the tax policy is not budget neutral; the government runs a marginal deficit because of the lump-sum transfers needed to hold the agent's utility constant. The deficit is equal to:
where dl P T ax dθ is the hicksian response to raising 1 unit of revenue through labor taxation.
In order for the additivity condition to hold, the corresponding expenditure policy must use lumpsum taxation to finance not only the roads but also the budget deficit induced by the tax policy.
Hence, P Exp (θ) must raise a surplus,
and provide one unit of roads, dG dθ = 1. Thus, the welfare impact of the expenditure policy (which equals the welfare impact of the combined policy) is given by
where dl P Exp dθ is the behavioral response to a policy that simultaneously increases government spending on public goods and raises more revenue than the cost of the public goods via lump-sum taxation.
Therefore, one can use MDWL (CV) as a measure of the welfare cost of distortionary taxation; but one must then be able to estimate the impact of an expenditure policy that not only finances the public goods, but also imposes a lump-sum tax of a greater amount than the cost of the public goods.
Intuitively, the behavioral response required from the expenditure policy simultaneously adds back in the income effects from lump-sum taxation and effects from the road expenditure.
Equations (17) and (21) present two different potential approaches to estimating the welfare impact of the same policy. If one knew the Hicksian elasticity or the MDWL, one could attempt to identify the corresponding expenditure policy. But, since most expenditure policies are not financed out of lump-sum taxation, it is arguably more natural to define the marginal costs of public funds as the welfare costs of policies that raise government revenue.
A.3 Externalities (and Internalities)
The analysis assumes individuals maximize their welfare without imposing any externalities on others or internalities on themselves. While researchers may debate the extent of externalities or internalities, my result that the causal response to the policy is required for policy analysis readily extends to a world with internalities and externalities.
To see this, now suppose that the agents' utility function is given by
where the externality imposed on agent i, E i , is produced in response to the consumption choices of all agents in the economy,
where x = {x i } i is the vector of all consumption decisions made by the agent (one could generalize this easily to incorporate l). I assume that there is no market for E i and that agents do not take E i into account when conducting their optimization. Note that I allow E i to interact arbitrarily with the utility function, but I assume it is taken as given in the agents' maximization problem. Thus, E i could represent a classical externality (e.g. pollution) or a behavioral "internality". An internality could be welfare costs of smoking that are not incorporated into their maximization program, or could incorporate "optimization frictions" of the form used by Chetty (2009a) where taxpayers over-estimate the costs of tax sheltering so that the marginal utility of tax sheltered income is not equal to the marginal utility of taxable income.
The value function is now given by
Given each agent's solution to this program, x i , I construct E i = f E i (x) and x is the vector of solutions to each agents optimization program.
All other definitions from Section 2 are maintained. In particular, policy paths are defined as in Proof. Taking the total derivative of V i with respect to θ, I have
Replacing terms, I have . Therefore, the welfare loss from a behavioral response that reduces government revenue may be counteracted by the welfare gain from any reduction on the externality imposed on other individuals.
Thus, financing government revenue using so-called "green taxes" that also reduce externalities may deliver higher government welfare than policies whose financing schemes do not reduce externalities. 43
This is the so-called "double-dividend" highlighted in previous literature (Bovenberg and de Mooji (1994); Goulder (1995); Parry (1995) ). My results show that even in this world, the causal effect of the policy on behavior, i.e. the policy elasticity, continue to be the behavioral elasticities that are relevant for estimating welfare impact of the policy.
A.4 Proof of Okun's Leaky Bucket Formula
The marginal welfare impact of the policy on a rich individual, i, is given by 
